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problems in Barendt's analysis originate not so much in his assump-
tion that philosophical reasoning may be valuable, as in his method 
of importing philosophy into constitutional interpretation. By as-
serting that philosophical principles tell us what the first amend-
ment means, Barendt not only transforms the amendment but also 
elevates particular philosophical principles to a status that they 
have not earned and may not merit. Such an approach reduces the 
incentive to evaluate philosophical arguments seriously and realisti-
cally. When scholars forego the temptation to pass off their philos-
ophy as interpretation of what the Constitution means, they will 
likely find themselves forced to do better philosophy. 
THE DOUGLAS LE'ITERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE 
PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUG-
LAS. Edited with an introduction by Melvin L. Urofsky.• 
Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler. 1987. Pp. xxiii, 448. $24.95. 
Michael E. Parrish 2 
In a recent assessment of the Justice who served longer than 
any other on the Supreme Court of the United States, a distin-
guished legal historian described William Orville Douglas as "the 
anti-judge," a man whose fierce individualism and idiosyncratic 
style challenged two of the dominant assumptions of modem Amer-
ican jurisprudence: that appellate jurists should remain aloof from 
most forms of political engagement and that their opinions ought to 
display a decent regard for precedent and the trappings of legal 
scholarship.3 Bill Douglas seldom paid obeisance to the judicial, 
political, or social conventions of the time, because in his concep-
tion of human nature they remained the principal enemies of the 
authentic self. He looked upon life as a series of obstacles to be 
overcome and battles to be won by the heroic self against the op-
pressive institutional arrangements of society. A loner and a narcis-
proper moral to draw, since I have made a meager attempt of my own to develop a "philo-
sophical" rationale for protecting speech. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the 
Theory of Free Expression, 60S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (1987). 
I. Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University. 
2. Professor of History, University of California, San Diego. 
3. White, The Anti-Judge: William 0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality, 
74 VA. L. REV. 17 (1988). 
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sist, he found it difficult to sustain intimate bonds with wives, 
children, or colleagues. 
Professor Melvin Urofsky, whose editorial skills helped to 
bring us five volumes of Louis Brandeis's letters, now gives us an 
equally large and clear window upon the life of another major figure 
in our legal history. In addition to an excellent introduction, he has 
chosen a rich sample of letters and memoranda from Douglas's per-
sonal papers that covers the full range of his controversial public 
and private life: the professorial years at Columbia and Yale, his 
days at the SEC, his relations with other Justices, spouses, and chil-
dren over a half-century, his nonjudicial writings, the abortive im-
peachment efforts of the early 1970s, and his final days in 
retirement. The annotations are lucid and crisp, never obtrusive. 
Professor Urofsky has shown once again that he is a master crafts-
man in this scholarly genre. The volume adds important new colors 
to the portrait of Douglas drawn by his biographer, and sketched in 
his own autobiographical writings. 
Douglas carefully sculptured a self-image and a public persona 
that combined elements of Horatio Alger, Peck's Bad Boy, and Ga-
ius Gracchus. He saw himself as the poor lad from the small town 
who, by virtue of his intellect and will power, overcame the social 
and physical handicaps of family misfortune, infantile paralysis, and 
assorted childhood phobias to scale the heights of the nation's 
power structure. He was the radical, outspoken professor of law 
who defended academic freedom and fought against the traditional-
ists in legal education; the two-fisted chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission who cleaned up the stock exchanges; the 
rugged outdoorsman who met the challenges of nature in mountain 
passes, fields, and streams; the world traveler and statesman with-
out portfolio who offered sage advice to the leaders of Third World 
countries struggling against colonialism, communism, and poverty; 
the fast-track jurist who always kept abreast of his case load and 
who routinely cut through legal technicalities to promote justice 
and equality; a tribune of the people and popular rights who en-
dured frequent political attacks from conservatives because of his 
unswerving devotion to liberty and fair play. 
Like all legends that are partially self-created, there was exag-
geration as well as truth to Bill Douglas's. If he tended to embellish 
his family's humble circumstances, the bout with polio was real 
enough. Although he never got rich tutoring students to put him-
self through Columbia Law School, he made a more comfortable 
living than he later recalled. He probably left the Cravath organiza-
tion in the late 1920s more out of boredom and to escape the drudg-
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ery of commercial practice than because he objected to the firm's 
money grubbing or its corporate clients. He resigned his faculty 
post at Columbia to protest President Nicholas Murray Butler's ap-
pointment of a new law dean, but not before he had in his pocket a 
lucrative offer from Yale. At the SEC he broke the old boy network 
of floor traders and specialists who had run the New York Stock 
Exchange like a private club and gave a greater voice in the industry 
to public brokerage firms, over-the-counter dealers, and accoun-
tants, but this hardly constituted a proletarian revolution on Wall 
Street. An absolutist with respect to the speech and press guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights, he displayed far less concern for civil liber-
ties in cases that touched the establishment clause, the fourth 
amendment, and the death penalty. Although he was an outspoken 
critic of racial discrimination, his dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard 
would have dealt a serious setback to voluntary affirmative action 
programs designed to overcome this tragic heritage. And despite a 
long judicial tenure punctuated by frequent controversy, Douglas 
did not leave behind a coherent jurisprudential legacy comparable 
to that of Felix Frankfurter, his great antagonist, or Hugo Black, 
his sometime ally. 
As one might expect, Douglas's years on the bench dominate 
this volume. A good sample of his correspondence with and opin-
ions about other Justices is included, as well as longer discussions 
that focus on particular issues: school desegregation, abortion, cap-
ital punishment, freedom of speech, and criminal due process. The 
disintegration of his personal and professional relationship with 
Frankfurter constitutes a chapter in itself. In 1932, Professor 
Douglas of Yale, after reading Professor Frankfurter's famous essay 
on the Constitution's compact clause, told the latter: "Truly, Felix, 
there are passages in the article which for sheer beauty of content 
and style have seldom been equalled in legal literature." By 1954, 
following a sharp conflict between them over a minor ICC case, 
Douglas complained that Frankfurter had refused "rather inso-
lently" to answer one of his questions. "We all know what a great 
burden your long discourses are," Douglas added. "So I am not 
complaining. But I do register a protest at your degradation of the 
Conference and its deliberations." Shortly before a stroke forced 
Frankfurter into retirement, Douglas wrote a memorandum that he 
never sent to the other Justices which described his chief antagonist 
as "an ill man," protested his "continuous violent outbursts against 
me," and threatened a boycott of the conferences in order to protect 
Frankfurter's health and life. 
At his nastiest, Douglas claimed that Frankfurter sided with 
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Vinson, Reed, Clark, and Jackson in the School Segregation Cases 
and voted on railroad reorganization matters to protect the financial 
interests of his close friend, Max Lowenthal. The first allegation 
badly misrepresents Frankfurter's position on civil rights4 and does 
not find support in Richard Kluger's authoritative account of the 
long history of the Brown litig:-1tion.s The second, which includes 
Douglas's suggestion that Fra:ilkfurter himself may have had an 
economic stake in the outcome, is sheer innuendo lacking any solid 
proof. In one respect, however, Douglas was absolutely right about 
his relationship with Frankfurter: "Twenty-odd years have 
shown," he wrote, "that I am a disturbing symbol in his [Frank-
furter's] life." In addition to their clashing jurisprudential styles, 
both men jockeyed for positions of influence in Washington, and 
Douglas's relaxed code of fidelity, including three divorces, was no 
doubt a constant reminder to Frankfurter of his own marital ordeal. 
That Douglas had a stormy relationship with Frankfurter (and 
later with Chief Justice Warren Burger) comes as no great surprise 
in the wake of numerous books about the Court published in the 
past decade. But several of Douglas's observations about two lib-
eral heroes, Earl Warren and Hugo Black, may raise a few eye-
brows. Despite his public image as the convivial humanitarian, 
Warren could be a tyrant when dealing with Court employees, law 
clerks, and even other Justices. Seven years after Warren's arrival, 
Douglas confided to retired Justice Sherman Minton that "in retro-
spect it was a sad day. His [Warren's] attitude toward the Court is 
the attitude of a prosecutor to his staff." One of Warren's outbursts 
against Frankfurter led even Douglas to express sympathy for the 
latter: "I've never been a Felix fan, as you know. But I never 
dreamed I'd be here when a Chief Justice degraded the Court like 
Earl Warren is doing. It's a nasty spectacle. Perhaps the old boy is 
off his rocker." A month later he complained to Minton that War-
ren had fired a Negro barber long employed by the Court after the 
police arrested him for drunkenness. "The CJ thinks the Court is a 
bureau in Sacramento, and that he runs it. . . . I don't know of a 
soul who respects him any more. I have defended him in public and 
in private. But no more .... The truth is, I think, that Earl Warren 
is a cheap politico with a Christ complex." 
Douglas also documents the anger and panic stirred in Warren 
and Black by the rising militancy among black civil rights demon-
strators. In the summer of 1963, a Mississippi court issued a sweep-
4. Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litiga· 
tion, 1946-60: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987). 
5. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 657·99 (1976). 
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ing temporary injunction against street protests in the state capital 
at Jackson. Douglas as well as Justices Goldberg and Brennan ar-
gued that the Court should review the restraining order or stay its 
enforcement because its language was so broad that even peaceful 
acts could be banned. Black, according to Douglas, reacted "rather 
violently" to these suggestions. "He [Black] reiterated what he has 
said before, that he thought it was time to clamp down on the Ne-
groes. The Chief Justice seemed to agree with him." Black urged 
the Court to deny stays in any cases from state courts involving 
racial issues that summer "because he thought that it was time to 
bear down on the Negroes and to make it appear at least that the 
Court was handing out justice even-handedly." A decade later, 
when the Court in Swann upheld mandatory school busing as an 
appropriate desegregation remedy, Black vigorously opposed it in 
conference ("Brennan said it was because the word 'bus' did not 
appear in the Constitution") and in the end "capitulated very, very 
reluctantly." 
His relationships with four wives (except the last), two chil-
dren, and numerous law clerks were usually distant, chilly, and ex-
ploitive. Loving mankind in the abstract, but seldom face to face, 
Douglas filled his own emotional needs first. The divorce from his 
second spouse, Mercedes Hester Davison, was especially tempestu-
ous. Two heavyweight Washington lawyers represented them, 
Clark Clifford for the Justice, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. for Mercedes. 
Rauh, who specialized in civil rights and civil liberties cases and 
who had considerable distaste for divorce litigation, agreed to repre-
sent Mercedes only under duress when Abe Fortas begged for help 
by telling him: "You're one of the few guys in this town who Bill 
can't and won't push around." At one point in the negotiations, 
Douglas offered his ex-wife a Himalayan tent, a painting of a water 
buffalo, gazelle horns, and a cougar skin as credit against a $2,500 
note. He accused her of withholding much of his personal property, 
including a Persian carpet, a quarter horse, and, above all, "a little 
ax" purchased from Abercrombie and Fitch. 
Douglas's views on foreign leaders and American foreign pol-
icy could be acute and pungent. After Sol Linowitz, the American 
ambassador to the OAS, defended the Guatemalan government, he 
received the following blast from Justice Douglas: "I still get nause-
ated at your misleading public utterances and the half-lies distrib-
uted to the public." He urged President Truman to reestablish 
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, exploit 
Chinese nationalism, and detach the regime from Soviet influence. 
"What we are doing on a small scale in Yugoslavia we can do on a 
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grand scale in Asia." At other times, his perspective could be 
frightfully naive. He described Sukamo of Indonesia as "a great 
democratic leader," and Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam as one 
who represented "the parliamentary tradition where free speech 
and free press are permitted, where opposing views are tolerated 
and even encouraged, where differences of opinion shape the course 
of events, where there is no dictator, where men debate and air their 
differences and then settle on a compromise solution." 
Although he never left his ROTC unit in Walla Walia during 
World War I, Douglas qualified for burial in Arlington National 
Cemetery and was interred there in 1980 near Warren, Black, and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Although it is doubtful that Douglas knew 
Woody Guthrie "from my hobo days," as he later claimed, he in-
sisted that "This Land is Your Land, This Land is My Land" be 
sung at his funeral. "It reflects not a socialist dream," he noted, 
"but . . . the right to move from place to place to look for a job or 
establish a new home, the right to move interstate without payment 
of a fee. . . . In other words, it expresses the vagrancy issue as I 
have expressed it and as it has become ingrained in the law." To 
the very end, he remained the Huck Finn of our judicial tradition, 
sharply critical of American society, but ultimately uncommitted, 
irresponsible, and self-indulgent, always anxious to escape Aunt 
Polly's grasp by fleeing into the wilderness. 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT. By Lucas A. Powe, Jr.1 Berkeley, Ca.: 
University of California Press. 1987. Pp. x, 295. $25.00. 
CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
By Patrick Parsons.2 Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Books. 
1987. Pp. iv, 168. $24.00. 
Henry Geller3 
As their titles indicate, these two books are both about broad-
l. Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor, University of Texas Law School. 
2. Assistant Professor of Communications, Pennsylvania State University. 
3. Professor of Practice, Duke University; Director, Washington Center for Public 
Policy Research. 
